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definition of mental states based entirely on physical science. Armstrong states,
“Thought…is something within the person which, in suitable circumstances
brings about speech...I believe this is a true account of what we mean by a

Physicalism is the assertion that the world is comprised solely

mental state” (262). The issue with this statement is that it disregards thought that

of material matter. All things are grounded in physical truths, and governed by

does not result in action. It ignores the internal aspects of thought and feeling.

physical processes. Thus, everything, including mental states, can be described

Thought is not merely latent when it is not in “suitable circumstances,” for it is

by purely objective means. Frank Jackson and Thomas Nagel are dissatisfied

generally agreed that it does in fact feel like something to think, perceive, feel,

with this physicalist view of the mind. This is because it does not account for

and believe. That is, thought exists as an internal experience, even if it does not

subjective experience, something that human beings universally and intuitively

bring about action. The reason Armstrong’s conclusion is so dissatisfying is that it

feel they have. To express this sentiment, Frank Jackson and Thomas Nagel

does not take into account this subjective aspect of mental states.

each perform their own thought experiment, designed to bring attention to this

Jackson expresses this subjective quality of mental states in his essay,

“what it’s like” aspect of the mind and its functions. In this paper, I will discuss

“What Mary Didn’t Know.” In it, he asks us to consider a situation in which a girl,

the physicalist view of the mind in greater depth before introducing Jackson and

Mary, is confined to a black and white room her entire life. She is educated with

Nagel’s objections to it. A close examination of their thought experiments will

black and white books and through lectures on a black and white television.

reveal the significance of subjective experience to mental states. Ultimately, we

Through this education, Mary learns all there is to know about every conceivable

will find that by appealing to our intuitive understanding of subjective

physical fact in the world, from every scientific discipline. Thus, she has complete

experience, Jackson and Nagel have succeeded in exposing the inadequacy of

knowledge of the material world (Jackson 320). This includes of course, the

the physicalist view of the mind.

physical science behind vision, light, and color. A physicalist, Jackson explains,

In “The Nature of the Mind,” philosopher David Armstrong asks what it

would claim that Mary knows everything there is to know. One day, Mary is

means to think, perceive, feel, and believe (Armstrong 259). He concludes that

released from the black and white room, and is exposed to color for the first time

the answer to this question must be rooted in modern science, for it is the only

in her life. Jackson asserts what he believes to be an obvious and indisputable

field where people have consistently reached intellectual consensus on issues.

truth—that Mary has acquired new knowledge from this experience. She has

Science is the only subject in which things can be certain, or at least very nearly

acquired knowledge of the experience of others (Jackson 321). Though Mary had

so. For this reason, he asserts, we should use physical science, specifically

perfect knowledge of every physical fact, she had not experienced color as

molecular biology, to give a complete account of man and the mind in purely

others had. Thus, while she had learned all about how the eye functions to

“physico-chemical terms” (Armstrong 260). This physicalist account of the mind

perceive color, she only learned what it was actually like for others to perceive

is based on the view that the world is made solely of concrete, scientific facts.

color when she was released from the room. In other words, Mary knew

Man, accordingly, is nothing but a physico-chemical mechanism that reacts to

everything there was to know about color in scientific terms, but when she saw

this material world (Armstrong 260). Hence, physicalism seeks an objective

color for herself, she experienced something that she previously had no
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knowledge of. This “what it’s like” aspect can only be described as subjective

sonar and about the bat’s anatomy and physical experiences. Just as Mary

experience. It cannot be defined in any objective or scientific way, yet it is still

knows every physical fact about the world, we could know every physical fact

knowledge. If one is ignorant of this firsthand experience, then one lacks this

there is to know about bats. We could even use all our knowledge of bats to try

particular piece of knowledge. Mental-states then, seem to have a subjective

and imagine what it would be like for us to use echolocation, to have wings and

element that is not explained or allowed by a physicalist definition of the nature

webbed feet and a furry body. Would we know then, what it is like to be a bat?

of the mind.

Nagel’s answer is no. I can imagine what it is like for me to be a bat, he says, but

To better understand the significance of subjective experience to true

that does not tell me what it is like for a bat to be a bat (Nagel 313). Just as Mary

knowledge of mental states, it is helpful to try to imagine oneself in a body

lacks knowledge about the experience of those who have been exposed to color,

unlike one’s own. Nagel does this in his essay, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”

we lack knowledge of the experience of bats. This knowledge that we lack has

Before introducing his thought experiment, Nagel explains that the real problem

nothing to do with the physical world, or with scientific truths. It is knowledge

with physicalist theories is that they do not shed any light on the mind-body

based entirely in subjective experience. We can only understand things in terms

problem. That is, they do not even attempt to explain “the most important and

of our own sensory perception. We cannot possibly know what it is truly like to be

characteristic feature of consciousness” (Nagel 311). Armstrong, when providing

a bat so long as we are human. We have a wealth of scientific knowledge that

his definition of thought, said that it was “something within the person which, in

can allow us to understand more about bats, but we will never understand what it

suitable circumstances brings about speech” (262). As stated above, this does

is like to be a bat. Similarly, a true understanding of human mental states cannot

nothing to explain what thought is when it is not in suitable circumstances.

be attained solely through study of physical processes, but must also be

Nagel goes on to explain that, at the most basic level, “the fact that an organism

explained by subjective experience.

has consciousness means that there is something it is like to be that organism…

How then, could we understand the world to be entirely physical?

something it is like for that organism” (Nagel 311). Thus, to have consciousness

Armstrong says in “The Nature of the Mind,” those who reject the view that we

is to have subjective experience. Nagel argues that, because the physicalist

can give a complete account of man and his mental states in physical terms

rejects subjective experience as necessary for a true understanding of the mind,

usually reject it for philosophical, or non-scientific reasons (259). But this is only

we currently cannot conceive of what an explanation of the physical nature of a

because science is incapable of explaining subjective experience, a crucial

mental state would be (311).

property of the mental state. To this, Armstrong might respond by saying that we

In order to further demonstrate the importance of this subjective

can reach no consensus on subjective experience, because it is different for all

experience to consciousness, Nagel employs the example of a bat. The bat, he

people. But the fact that our experiences are all different is precisely the point.

believes, is a solid example because it is fundamentally different from us, yet we

And while it is true that we cannot reach any consensus on exactly what this

still believe that it has experience; there is something it is like to be a bat (Nagel

“what it’s like” aspect is, we can reach an agreement that it is something we all

312). We know bats use sonar, or echolocation as a form of perception that is

have. Armstrong might then respond to the problem of subjectivity simply by

very different from our own. We could learn everything there is to learn about

asserting that we have no better way to reach any definitive conclusion about the
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Armstrong acknowledges that science cannot tell us about God or
morality or justice. Why then, should it be able to tell us about something as
complex as consciousness, something that is so undeniably unique to every
living thing that experiences it? In other words, the question of the nature of the
mind may not have one simple truth. If the physicalist wants to employ scientific
reason, he should ask a scientific question. Nagel and Jackson’s thought
experiments do not deny that mental states cause behavior, and function to
perform physical events. Rather, their experiments demonstrate that the human
mind does more than this. Both experiments reveal the limitations of objective
knowledge. If we are to gain a complete understanding of the nature of the
mind, it is essential to look beyond science, and recognize that subjective
experience cannot be separated from the mental state. Thus, physicalism can
give neither a full account of the mind, nor an explanation of the true nature of
man.

!
In this essay Sarah is careful to avoid a major pitfall of philosophy
papers – an inadequate or burdensome summary – and instead takes multiple
philosophical ideas to support an understanding and objection to the
physicalist view of the mind. This paper is an exemplary model of a philosophy
paper – summary, argument, counter-argument, conclusion – and incorporates
each necessary aspect while presenting a clear and thorough understanding of
the topics at hand. In incorporating summarized examples of both Nagel and
Jackson’s arguments Sarah avoids a heavy handed summary and instead ties
in her examples directly to the point she wishes to explore. This not only
directs the reader to her purpose, but leaves the reader with a clear outline of
where the paper is headed and how each philosopher’s arguments are taken
into account in her objection. In analyzing the counter-argument to Jackson
and Nagel, Sarah gives adequate room to explain this point, yet leaves the
reader with a clear sense of how this argument still presents dilemma’s to
Jackson and Nagel. Overall, the essay is well balanced and incorporates a
smooth underlying current along which the reader is drawn into the essay and
gains a clear picture of both the objections and final conclusion Sarah makes.
-Tori Couch, Writing Center Consultant
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